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Unfairness without Deception: Recent Positions
of the Federal Trade Commission
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Federal Trade Com-
mission v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,' the "unfairness doctrine" has
received considerable attention. Nevertheless, practical application
of the doctrine has been rare and directed at extremely diverse areas
of trade regulation law. This judicial hesitancy may indicate uncer-
tainty on the part of a cautious Federal Trade Commission (FTC), but
it is equally likely that the FTC is seeking to carefully develop a doc-
trine which not only strengthens its powers but also stays within the
legislative confines of section 5 of -the Federal Trade Commission
Act.2
This note will analyze three areas in the development of the unfair-
ness doctrine: (1) statutory and case law background; (2) current
legal applications; and (3) validity and legal utility of the doctrine
as a tool of the FTC.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Statutory and Case Law Background
Section 5 of the present Federal Trade Commission Act, as well
as the FTC itself, traces its origin to the Federal Trade Commission
Act of 1914.3 The original version of section 5 was drafted to
remedy the ineffectiveness of the Sherman Antitrust Act4 by seeking
to place some responsibility for control of anti-competitive activity in
the hands of the Commission. The relevant portion of section5
reads: "Unfair methods of competition in commerce are hereby de-
clared unlawful."5
1. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970). Section 5 states in part: "Unfair methods of
competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are
declared unlawful."
3. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719.
4. See S. REp. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1914). A good deal of the dis-
turbed congressional attitude resulted from Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S.
1 (1911), and United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
5. See note 2 supra.
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The term "unfair" was used purposefully because of its vagueness.
In the House of Representatives' debate on H.R. Bill No. 15613,
the House version of the 1914 Act, Representative Morgan stated:
It is well enough to prohibit certain acts-to make certain things
unlawful-but we should do more than this. We should by law
promulgate a rule of business morality, create a standard by which
the methods and practices of industrial corporations shall be
judged. 7
Nevertheless, some members of Congress felt that the term had al-
ready been defined by the common law courts8 and that failure to
further define "unfair" within the Act would either unduly restrict the
power of the Commission or, in the words of Senator Reed:
[confer] upon the commission the power practically to make
the law, to declare that which, in their opinion, is right to be right,
and that which, in their opinion, is wrong to be wrong. Thus
we will have substituted, for the Government of the people by
a law of the land, the rule of the people by the opinion of three
or five men."
Despite these ominous warnings and the apparent uneasiness about
the term "unfair," the bill was passed with section 5 intact.
The first serious challenge and restriction on the FTC's authority
came in FTC v. Gratz.10 The case involved a practice which is now
commonly called a "tying arrangement" whereby a seller refuses to
sell one item without the purchase of another item. In this instance
the respondent sold steel ties used for binding cotton bales, "tying"
the sales of the steel ties to the concurrent purchase of jute bagging
used to wrap the bales. Without further explanation the FTC labeled
this practice an "unfair" method of competition and issued a cease
and desist order." The Supreme Court, in affirming the court of ap-
peals' 12 reversal of the Commission's order, held that since the term
"unfair method of competition" was not defined within the statute,
6. H.R. 15613, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 6648 (1914).
7. 51 CONG. REc. 8856 (1914) (remarks of Representative Morgan).
8. 51 CONG. Rc. 8979 (1914) (remarks of Representative Murdock).
9. 51 CONG. REC. 12023 (1914) (remarks of Senator Reed). Senator Reed argued
that since the common law had already attached a meaning to "unfair competition,"
the new Commission would be limited in its authority to the narrow meaning ascribed
to this term by the numerous cases he cited. In rebuttal, Senator Hollis maintained
that even if future courts felt bound to rely on the common law definition rather than
construe a colloquial or common sense meaning, there were an equal number of cases
which adopted a broad definition of "unfair." 51 CONG. REC. 12148 (1914) (remarks
of Senator Hollis).
10. 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
11. This is the standard remedy employed by the FTC and is authorized by 15
U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970).
12. 258 F. 314 (2d Cir. 1919).
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its determination was a matter of law rather than fact and, conse-
quently, required judicial rather than administrative construction.
[The words] are clearly inapplicable to practices never here-
tofore regarded as opposed to good morals because characterized
by deception, bad faith, fraud, or oppression, or as against public
policy because of their dangerous tendency unduly to hinder com-
petition or create monopoly.' 3
Since the tying arrangement was not one which was "heretofore re-
garded as opposed to good morals," the FTC could not declare it to
be one now. In essence, the Court was restricting the FTC's role
to that of fact-finder,' 4 and since the Commission was not authorized
to develop a body of unfair practies, it would apparently be limited
to regulating those practices already recognized by case or statutory
law. 15
The second major restriction on the FTC's authority to regulate
unfair practices came in FTC v. Raladam Co.16 The FTC had issued
a cease and desist order against the manufacturer of an obesity cure
who had represented his product as safe and scientifically developed.
Despite findings of fact sufficient to support the Commission's conclu-
sions, the Supreme Court, affirming the court of appeals 7 which had
again overruled the FTC, questioned whether the manufacturer's ad-
vertisements had any effect on competition.' 8 In the absence of an
express finding that a competitor's business was diverted as a result
of the defendant manufacturer's "unfair methods of competition," the
Court held that the Commission was powerless to issue a cease and
desist order. Section 5 of the Act was, in the Court's view, a law
concerned with competitors and the public's interest in free competi-
tion, and any FTC action without this concern was unauthorized.
The case which is often cited as the progenitor of the unfairness
13. 253 U.S. at 427 (1920).
14. This view of the FTC as little more than a specialized trial court was continued
in FTC v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923), involving exclusive dealing con-
tracts, and FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923), involving a nominal
leasing arrangement tied to the sale of gasoline. Both cases considered section 5 of
the FTC Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act jointly.
15. In his dissent, Justice Brandeis maintained that it was unnecessary for the Com-
mission to set forth its reasons for declaring a practice unfair because it was an issue
of fact which, if supported by sufficient evidence, was conclusive. 253 U.S. at 431.
The determination of whether a method of competition was unfair was, in Justice Bran-
deis' view, initially an administrative decision. Id. at 436-37.
16. 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
17. FTC v. Raladam Co., 42 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1930).
18. 283 U.S. at 646-47. The Supreme Court defined three distinct prerequisites to
the issuance of a cease and desist order: (1) that the complained methods are unfair;
(2) that they are methods used in competition in commerce; and (3) that the Commis-
sion's proceeding was in the public interest. The Court assumed the existence of the
first and third requisites here.
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doctrine is FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros.19 The respondent was a
candy manufacturer engaged in the selling and distribution of package
assortments of candy commonly known as "break and take" packages.
The assortments were offered for sale with an element of chance in-
volved in the purchase price. Some pieces of candy were wrapped
with pennies included; others had the price tag, which varied in
amount, concealed in the wrapper; and another group had concealed
centers with different colors, the color determining the prize which
would accompany the purchase. The FTC issued a cease and desist
order against the respondent on the ground that the practice employed
a lottery device which, as a form of gambling, was counter to public
policy. Competitors who refused to employ such practices, for moral
or other reasons, were thereby placed at a competitive disadvantage.
The Third Circuit overturned the Commission's order, since other
competitors were free to use the same sales method if they wished."
In reversing the court of appeals' decision, the Supreme Court recog-
nized that:
Although the method of competition adopted by respondent in-
duces children, too young to be capable of exercising an intelligentjudgment of the transaction, to purchase an article less desirable
in point of quality or quantity than that offered at a comparable
price in the straight goods package, we may take it that it does
not involve any fraud or deception.2 '
The Court stated that the Act had a broader purpose than regulat-
ing only those methods of competition in violation of the Sherman
Act: 22
[H]ere the competitive method is shown to exploit consumers,
children, who are unable to protect themselves. . . . [I]t is clear
that the practice is of the sort which the common law and crimi-
nal statutes have long deemed contrary to public policy. . . . It
would seem a gross perversion of the normal meaning of the word
which is the first criterion of statutory construction, to hold that
the method is not "unfair. '23
Significantly, in upholding the Commission's order, the Court deferred
to the FTC's expertise as possessing considerable weight in determin-
ing what methods of competition were unfair, being careful not to
overstep the boundaries of Gratz.24 The case is important in that it
19. 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
20. 63 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1933).
21. 291 U.S. at 309 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 310.
23. Id. at 313 (emphasis added).
24. The Court cautiously stated: "We do not intimate either that the statute does
540
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freed the term "unfair" as used in section 5 from the confines of fraud
and deception and also recognized a certain amount of judicial reliance
upon the FTC's determination of "unfair methods of competition."26
The Public Interest
In addition to expanding the definition of the phrase "unfair
methods of competition," early decisions also expressed an increasing
concern for the "public interest" apart from the jurisdictional require-
ment,2" considering the impact that these "unfair methods" would have
upon the consumer as well as the competitor. In FTC v. Winsted
Hosiery Co.,27 a manufacturer who sold underwear with labeling imply-
ing that the garment was all wool when in fact it was only part wool,
was held to be employing deceptive and misleading acts in violation
of section 5. The significance of the case lies in the fact that this
labeling practice was so commonly used in the trade that the manufac-
turer's direct customers, the retailers, were clearly not deceived. The
Court based its support of the FTC's cease and desist order on the
Commission's finding that the labels were calculated to deceive and
did in fact deceive a substantial portion of the public.2"
Continuing this line of reasoning, later court decisions sought to
protect the public from deceptive trade names.2 9 Various sales prac-
tices were deemed unfair by the Commission and the courts, not be-
cause competitors who were trained and experienced would be misled,
but because the "trusting public" consisting of "teachers, doctors, col-
lege professors, club women, and business men" would be and were
misled.A°
not authorize the prohibition of other and hitherto unknown methods of competition
or . . . that the Commission may prohibit every unethical competitive practice ....
Id. at 314.
25. In Wolf v. FTC, 135 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1943), the court again upheld the
FTC's finding of unfairness (absent fraud and deception) in another lottery arrange-
ment involving the purchase price of various articles selected from the distributor's cat-
alogue. These "lottery cases" have prompted an FTC Trade Regulation. 34 Fed. Reg.
218 (1969).
26. FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304 (1934). In FTC v. Klesner, 280
U.S. 19 (1929), the Supreme Court held that "the mere fact that it is to the interest
of the community that private rights shall be respected is not enough to support a find-
ing of public interest. To justify filing a complaint the public interest must be specific
and substantial." Id. at 28.
27. 258 U.S. 483 (1922).
28. For a decision on similar facts involving a manufacturer of marble products,
see Marietta Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 50 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1931 ).
29. FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933). The FTC found that the
use of the word "Milling" in the company's name implied that the company actually
milled their grain when in fact the grain was bought already milled. The Supreme
Court reversed the Commission's order to suppress the use of the trade name and in-
stead required only that qualifying language be used.
30. FTC v. Standard Education Society, 302 U.S. 112, 117 (1937). Encyclopedia
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Despite this concern with the public interest, the express language
of section 5 required that the FTC demonstrate some actual or poten-
tial danger to competition. Deception of the public was important
only in the fact that competitors not employing the unfair practices
were at a commercial disadvantage.
The Wheeler-Lea Amendment and The Emphasis On Deception
The expansion of section 5 to include concern for the consumer
occurred in 1938 with the adoption of the Wheeler-Lea Amendment
to the FTC Act.3' The amendment to section 5 made "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices," as well as "unfair methods of competi-
tion," unlawful. To a large extent, .the passage of the amendment was
due to the Supreme Court's decision in FTC v. Raladam Co.32  As
Senator Wheeler stated:
The object of the bill is to obviate the necessity of spending thou-
sands of dollars . . . in running down a case to see whether or
not injury [to competition] has been done. 33
Other legislators such as Representative Lea, felt that "the primary
object [of the bill] is to protect the consumer."34  The House Report
on the amendment concluded:
This amendment makes the consumer, who may be injured by an
unfair trade practice, of equal concern, before the law, with the
merchant or manufacturer injured by the unfair methods of a dis-
honest competitor. 35
In either case, the effect of the amendment was to permit the FTC
to proceed against persons who employed unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in interstate commerce.
Despite the use of the disjunctive word "or" in the phrase "unfair
or deceptive," courts which were called upon to construe the amend-
ment considered the phrase as a unit.30 Although proof of an inten-
salesmen employed such practices as telling the purchaser that he was "specially se-
lected" and that the encyclopedias were free-that the only charge was for the loose-
leaf supplements (which happened to cost the normal price of the encyclopedias).
31. Act of March 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111.
32. See the remarks of Senator Wheeler, 80 CONG. REc. 6590 (1936).
33. Id. at 6593.
34. 83 CONG. REC. 392 (1938) (remarks of Representative Lea).
35. H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937). Also see S. REP. No.
1705, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1936).
36. Practically no mention of the meaning of the term "unfair" as used in the
Wheeler-Lea Amendment is included in the congressional debate, and the term was not
further defined within the amendment. Presumably, Congress was satisfied with the
meaning that the courts and the FTC had given to it since 1914. See note 11 supra.
However, at least one senator, Senator White, remarked:
I think one must voice his disapproval of unfair and deceptive practices and
542
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tion to deceive was not required under the Act, 7 a finding of actual
deception or a tendency to deceive can be found in virtually every
case relying principally upon the amended portion of section 5.38
Nevertheless, "proof of falsity is often the most difficult, time consum-
ing, and expensive element of the agency's case."39  In order to make
out a cause of action for deception under section 5, complaint counsel
must show falsity by at least one of the following methods:
(1) The product or service is not as effective as claimed and
as understood by the hypothetical consumer at the selected
intelligence level.
(2) The product's performance is different from the claimed
performance.
(3) The claim cannot be verified.4 0
Inherent in proof of falsity is the problem of the consumer's intelli-
gence level. Is the consumer an ignorant, unsophisticated person who
accepts all that he perceives as true,41 or is he a reasonably intelligent
"average member of the public"42 who takes everything "with a grain
of salt"? In considering false advertising, is the advertisement to be
judged by its general impression, 43 or is literal truth a valid defense to a
charge of deception? 44
In addition to proving falsity or deception, the FTC may also have
to contend with several defenses available to the defendants. The
defendants may argue:
(1) The customers with whom they deal are aware of the
acts precisely as he would voice his disapproval of sin, but I should be very
much more comfortable if I knew just what acts or practices we are making
unlawful. . . . 80 CONG. REC. 6597 (1936).
37. Gimbel Bros. Inc. v. FTC, 116 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1941).
38. This is especially true in false advertising cases. See L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC,
442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971); FTC v. Sterling Drug Inc.. 317 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1963);
Korber Hats Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 358 (1st Cir. 1962). As a practical matter the
FTC has often included the allegation of "unfair method of competition" as well as
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in false advertising cases, since the false adver-
tising, in addition to being misleading, may also be a prohibited method of competition.
See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307 (7th Cir. 1919).
39. Note, Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1005, 1078 (1967).
40. See Gellhorn, Proof of Consumer Deception Before the FTC, 17 U. KAN. L.
REv. 559, 563 (1969).
41. Judge Augustus Hand, in General Motors Corp. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33 (2d Cir.
1940), made the solemn proclamation that ". . . if the Commission, in its discretion,
thinks it best to insist upon a form of advertising clear enough so that, in the words
of the prophet Isaiah, 'wayfaring men, though fools, shall not err therein', it is not for
the courts to revise their judgment." Id. at 36.
42. Ward Laboratories Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1960).
43. Charles of the Ritz Distributors Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944);
Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1943).
44. Generally this has not been permitted. See Sebrone Co. v. FTC, 135 F.2d 676
(7th Cir. 1943); Bockenstette v. FTC, 134 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1943).
543
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falsity and therefore not misled or deceived.4 5
(2) The challenged advertisements are merely "puffing" or
opinion.46
(3) The ads are protected forms of speech under the first amend-
ment.
47
(4) They have no financial interest in the product being adver-
tised. 48
(5) The challenged representation has a secondary meaning other
than the one allegedly misleading, and that it is the former
meaning which is commonly understood. 49
In summary, successful prosecution of a deception case under sec-
tion 5 of the Act is not necessarily an easy task for the FTC. It is
not surprising that recent judicial recognition of unfairness as a doc-
trine separate and independent from deception has been greeted by
the Commission with great enthusiasm.
Recent Developments
In FTC v., Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 50 the FTC issued a cease
and desist order to prohibit the Sperry & Hutchinson Company from
using injunctions and threats of injunctions to prevent unauthorized
exchange and redemption of its trading stamps. The FTC maintained
that such tactics prevented independent promoters from dealing in the
trading stamps, constituting "unfair methods of competition and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices" in violation of section 5. The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the Commission on the
the ground that no demonstration of any antitrust violation had been
made.51 This result was not surprising since the FTC's unfairness
argument to the Court, as well as its written opinion at the administra-
45. Where a watch manufacturer used the word "ruby" to describe certain synthetic
parts of his watches and the ads were addressed only to the trade and not the general
public, no deception was found. Waltham Precision Instrument Co., Inc. v. FTC, 1964
Trade Cas. 70,992, issue not raised on appeal, 327 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1964).
46. Carlay Co. v. FTC, 153 F.2d 493 (7th Cir. 1946); Bristol Myers v. FTC, 185
F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1950). "Puffing" is a variable concept. "What was considered puffery
twenty years ago might not be puffery today." Statement of R. Pitofsky, Director of
Bureau of Consumer Protection of the FTC, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1971, § 3 at 15,
col. 1.
47. See note 116 inf ra.
48. In Scientific Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1941), the Commission
was held to be without authority to issue a cease and desist order forbidding the sale
of pamphlets describing the purported dangers resulting from the use of aluminum
cooking utensils where the publishers had no financial interest in the cooking utensil
trade, despite the fact that the pamphlets were false and misleading.
49. Although this defense has long been recognized, it has rarely been sustained.
FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922).
50. 405 U.S. 241 (1972).
51. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 146, 150-51 (5th Cir. 1970).
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tive level, rested on a classical antitrust foundation. On appeal to the
Supreme Court, the FTC shifted its argument and stated that practices
of the respondent were unfair to consumers, and as such the Commis-
sion had authority to regulate these practices regardless of their com-
petitive impact.52 The Court, in accepting this argument as legally
sound, considered the impact of FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros. and
the Wheeler-Lea Amendment as replacing the earlier perspectives of
FTC v. Gratz and FTC v. Raladam Co. The Court stated:
Thus, legislative and judicial authorities alike convince us that the
Federal Trade Commission does not arrogate excessive power to
itself if, in measuring a practice against the elusive, but congres-
sionally mandated standards of fairness, it, like a court of equity,
considers public values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter
or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws.5 3
The Court reversed the court of appeals on the issue of the scope
of section 5 and the FTC's authority thereunder, but it refused to sus-
tain the Commission's order on the ground that its arguments focusing
on injury to the consumer differed materially from its written opinion
based upon the injury to competitors. The judgment of the lower
court was modified and remanded accordingly.
The uncertainty which surrounds the case lies in the fact that al-
though the Court held that unfairness can be found outside the letter
of the antitrust laws, no boundary or limitation on the Commission's
authority in this area was determined. At least since FTC v. Brown
Shoe Co.,54 the Supreme Court has considered the Commission to pos-
sess "broad powers to declare trade practices unfair." 55 Yet, Sperry
& Hutchinson involved neither the deception nor unfair sales practices
which had marked the previous signposts of unfairness. In a footnote,
the Sperry & Hutchinson Court cited three factors which the Commis-
sion had published concerning the determination of whether a practice
which is neither in violation of the antitrust laws nor deceptive is
nevertheless unfair:
(1) Whether the practice, without necessarily having been prev-
iously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been
established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise-whether
in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common
law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2)
Whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous;
52. 405 U.S. at 246.
53. Id. at 244 (emphasis added).
54. 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
55. Id. at 320-21.
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(3) Whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or com-
petitors or other businessmen) .56
Although the Court apparently cited these guidelines with approval,
it is not clear whether they mark the boundaries of FTC authority.
The comparison of the FTC to a "court of equity" suggests authority
in the regulation of unfair trade practices limited only by equitable
principles. The Commission has proceeded cautiously in several di-
rections since Sperry & Hutchinson Co. and evidently is not confident
of its powers in the unfairness areaY
Even prior to Sperry & Hutchinson Co., the FTC had considered
and used the allegation of "unfair" against business practices which
were not necessarily deceptive. Presumably, the concept of unfairness
includes deception,"' so it was often expedient for the FTC to make
the charge of unfairness when the practice was also clearly deceptive.
In order to determine how the FTC will utilize the unfairness doc-
trine in the future, it will be helpful to examine the Commission's
past consideration of unfair sales and advertising practices.
Unfair Sales Practices
The types of sales practices which have been found unfair by the
FTC have been limited only to the extent of the sellers' imaginations. 59
Some of the more prevalent practices warrant brief consideration:
(1) Lottery Sales-As discussed previously in FTC v. R.F. Keppel
& Bros." and as also found in FTC v. Wolf, 61 the use of lottery de-
vices to encourage or create sales has long been declared "immortal"
and in violation of public policy. Regardless of the fact that the lottery
device was supplied without consideration and the recipients could
determine their own course of action towards the device, they "are
a species of gambling which . . . is unethical, unfair, and in viola-
tion of the law."6 2
56. 405 U.S. at 244 n.5. These guidelines were published as: Statement of Basis
and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule 408, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and La-
beling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8355
(1964). Although this Rule has been superseded by an act of Congress, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 et seq. (1970), its precepts may still represent the Commission's interpretation
of "unfairness."
57. See the remarks of R. Pitofsky, Director of the FTC Bureau of Consumer Pro-
tection, 595 Antitrust and Trade Regulation Reporter: AA-5 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as ATRR].
58. 2 TRADE REG. REP. 7 7500, at 12,012.
59. See 2 TRADE REG. REP. % 7903-7960.
60. 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
61. See note 25 supra.
62. Chicago Silk Co. v. FTC, 90 F.2d 689, 690 (7th Cir. 1937). The manufac-
turer of silk stockings distributed punch cards containing the numbers from 1 to 60.
546
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(2) Shipping Unordered Merchandise-The shipment of un-
ordered goods or the shipment of larger amounts of goods than were
actually ordered has been prohibited by the FTC as a means of "deal-
ing unfairly with . . . customers in devious ways."63  The customer
may or may not be deceived in such cases depending upon whether
he becomes legally bound to pay for the unrequested merchandise.
In either case, the practice of intentionally shipping unordered mer-
chandise is unfair, and allegations that the size of operations, clerical
errors, or malfunctioning of electronic equipment caused the improper
shipment are not sufficient to overcome proof of a deliberate course
of action. 64
(3) Substitution of Goods-The selling of goods different from
those ordered without the buyer's knowing consent has been held to
be in violation of section 5. The leading case in this area is FTC
v. Algoma Lumber Co.,65 where the seller was found to be involved
in an unfair practice by selling ponderosa pine under the label of
white pine. Despite the failure of the Commission to find that white
pine was clearly superior to ponderosa pine, the Court stated that the
"consumer is prejudiced if upon giving an order for one thing, he is
supplied with something else." 66
Often, the substitution of goods is part of an organized plan to mis-
represent the merchandise in hopes that upon learning of the substitu-
tion, the buyer, rather than suffer lengthy delay and nuisance in await-
ing reimbursement or replacement, will be satisfied with the substi-
tuted goods. In Algoma, the Commission found the practice to be
deceptive as well as unfair.67
(4) Coercion, Harassment, and Scare Tactics-These practices
are clearly unfair to the extent that a buyer is compelled to make
a purchase in contravention to his will. Thus, threats to institute suit
in order to coerce buyers to accept goods in excess of the quantity
ordered," or to publicly criticize in a written publication the goods
of any merchant who fails to contribute financially to the publication, 9
A customer who punched a particular number would receive a pair of stockings in ex-
change for the sales price indicated beneath the punch.
63. Dorfman v. FTC, 144 F.2d 737, 739 (8th Cir. 1944).
64. U.S. v. Vitasafe Corp., 1964 Trade Cas. 71231, at 79,915, 234 F. Supp. 710
(S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1966).
65. 291 U.S. 67 (1934).
66. Id. at 78.
67. National Trade Publications Service, Inc. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 790 (8th Cir.
1962).
68. Dorfman v. FTC, 144 F.2d 737 (8th Cir. 1944).
69. Lane v. FTC, 130 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1942).
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have been held to be unfair practices. Similarly, falsely representing
that furnaces manufactured by competitors are defective and likely to
result in fires or asphyxiation, so as to frighten the buyer, has also
been found unfair. 0
The FTC and the courts recently examined negative option sales
plans and traditional concepts of the holder in due course in light of
the unfairness doctrine. A negative option sales plan is utilized when
a seller, pursuant to a contractual arrangement with a buyer, periodi-
cally sends an announcement to the buyer identifying merchandise that
he proposes to ship. The buyer must thereafter accept and pay for
this merchandise or send written instructions within a specified period
to withhold the shipment. In May, 1970, the FTC initiated a rule-
making procedure relating to the use of these plans, and proposed a
trade regulation rule prohibiting their use. 7 ' The rule was proposed
because the Commission believed that sellers who use negative option
plans have:
(9) Constructed and operated a merchandising technique which
is inherently unfair in that it relies . . .on exploitation of
subscribers' natural preoccupations . . . and on traits of hu-
man character such as procrastination . . . in order to im-
pose liability upon subscribers for (undesired) merchan-
dise ....
(10) Constructed and operated a merchandising technique which
is inherently unfair in that it permits sellers to take advan-
tage of . . . the uncertainties of postal service, computer
"errors" of the seller's own doing, and centralized methods
of credit administration and debt collection.72
In response to this proposal, various industry and trade association
groups, notably the Association of American Publishers Inc. and the
Recording Industry of America, Inc., submitted an alternate proposed
rule to the FTC which did not prohibit but rather regulated the use
of the plans. The Commission perceived the issue to be "whether
the negative option plan is so oppressive to consumers and so lacking
in redeeming virtues that an outright ban would be justified. '73 De-
spite strong consumer protest,74 the revised rule was proposed and
70. Holland Furnace Co. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1961).
71. 35 Fed. Reg. 7437 (1970).
72. id.
73. 38 Fed. Reg. 4907 (1973).
74. Included among the opponents of the regulatory rule were the National Con-
sumer Law Center and the Attorney General for the State of Wisconsin, who argued
that the practice is inherently unfair and that no amount of regulation short of total
prohibition would cure its evils.
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finally promulgated by the FTC on February 15, 1973.7' The rule
concentrates on the seller's duties in advance of shipment and within
the promotional material, and the buyer's rights and duties in relation
to the merchandise shipped. The rule does not ban the use of the
plan, nor does it define the buyer's rights pertaining to merchandise
not received or of an inferior quality.
The second practice in which the Commission's reliance upon the
unfairness doctrine is particularly evident involves the holder in due
course doctrine. This concept allows the assignee in good faith of
a negotiable instrument to be vested with the rights of collection and
payment on the note while, at the same time, remaining free from
most defenses based on the contract between the buyer and the seller-
assignor.76  Consequently, if the buyer is unsatisfied with the mer-
chandise or subject matter of the sales contract, he may be precluded
from asserting his dissatisfaction as a claim or defense based on the
contract and be required to complete payment to the holder in due
course. This practice is especially distasteful when, as is often done,
it is coupled with misrepresentations as to the product itself.
This was the case in All-State Industries of North Carolina, Inc.77
The defendant was charged with a violation of section 5 by engaging
in the illegal advertising, sale, and installation of various home im-
provement products. The defendant employed a "bait and switch"
technique whereby inexpensive products were promoted and sold, but
after the sale, were criticized as inferior by the same dealer who sold
them, and a more expensive product was demonstrated to the buyer.
The Commission declared this bait and switch technique to be in viola-
tion of section 5. However, the defendants had also employed a
standard practice of negotiating the customer's instrument of indebt-
ness to third parties, thereby extinguishing the consumer's contract
defenses. The FTC held that the failure to disclose this routine
assignment to prospective purchasers was "first . . . inherently unfair
... and second, ... deceptive. '7 8  The Commission cited its
responsibility:
not only with preventing well-understood, clearly defined, un-
lawful conduct but [also] with utilizing its broad powers of investi-
75. 38 Fed. Reg. 4896 (1973). However, because of the uncertainty surrounding
the Commission's substantive rulemaking authority, the effective date for the rule has
been deferred pending litigation. See note 86 infra.
76. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305.
77. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] Trade Cas. 1 18,740, at 21,100 (FTC 1969), aff'd,
423 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970).
78. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] Trade Cas. % 18740, at 21,104 (FTC 1969).
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gation and its accumulated knowledge and experience in the field
of trade regulation to investigate, identify, and define those prac-
tices which should be forbidden as unfair because contrary to the
public policy declared in the Act.79
A case with similar facts has recently reached the Commission with
similar results. In Southern States Distributing Co.80 the defendant
was charged with violating section 5 by employing a bait and switch
technique in conjunction with the assignment of sales contracts to a
holder in due course finance company. Although the administrative
law judge found no violation concerning the assignments since the re-
spondents did not affirmatively represent that 'they would handle their
own financing, the Commission, citing All-State Industries, reversed
and stated that "unfairness and deception in the use of holder-in-due-
course do not arise only when express misrepresentations are made."'"
The Commission then ordered that the respondents eliminate this potent-
ially injurious deception by affirmatively disclosing the possibility of
assignment in the sales contract."2
Unsatisfied, complaint counsel sought to go one step further, argu-
ing that the act of assigning consumer contracts to a holder in due
course was inherently unfair, and that in order to equalize the seller-
buyer relationship, the respondent should be prohibited from negotiat-
ing the contracts in such a fashion. In respect to the particular re-
spondent at bar, this argument was rejected by the Commission:
Whatever the validity of this argument when applied on an indus-
try wide 'basis, standing alone, without evidence of its peculiar ap-
plicability to the case at bar, it cannot justify depriving respon-
dents alone of the fruits of unhindered negotiability. What must
be shown for this to be warranted, we think, is some evidence
of actual or imminent injury from operation of the doctrine in
practice, beyond the deception noted above.8 3
Despite the fact that the respondents failed to perform many of their
contracts, the Commission refrained from using its power to declare
specific acts unfair and to order the respondent to cease and desist
from this practice. The FTC noted that the respondents might be
79. Id. at 21,105.
80. 3 TRADE REG. REP. % 20,507, at 20,440 (FTC 1973).
81. Id. at 20,445.
82. On the ability of the FTC to order affirmative disclosure, see Alberty v. FTC,
182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1950), as compared with J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d
884 (6th Cir. 1967).
83. 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,507, at 20,445. In a footnote included with its opin-
ion, the Commission suggested that it would not be necessary to show that every com-
pany in the industry had used the holder in due course technique in order to justify
an industry-wide prohibition on such negotiability pursuant to the Commission's rule-
making powers. Id. at 20,446 n.5.
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at a competitive disadvantage if they were not able to use this tech-
nique, and stressed the fact that there was no evidence that consumers
had actually been injured through deprivation of a contract claim or
defense. The stance was similar to that taken in regard to the negative
option sales plans where regulation of disclosure was preferred over
total prohibition. If the practice is inherently unfair, there would ap-
pear to be no reason why the FTC, pursuant to its "broad powers...
and . . .accumulated knowledge and experience . . . to investigate,
identify, and define those practices which should be forbidden as un-
fair,"'84 could not have prohibited the practice.
Unfair Advertising Practices
As one FTC official has pointed out, the use of the unfairness
theory in the interest of consumers has been largely restricted to com-
mercial practices rather than commercial advertising. 5 Recently,
however, the Commission has examined its use in two advertising ap-
plications: (1) as a basis for the advertising substantiation program;
and (2) as a standard governing the manner or focus of advertising.
The FTC first asserted its authority to require advertisers to sub-
stantiate their product claims in June, 1971.86 The intent of the
Commission was apparently twofold: to deter unfair or deceptive acts
by revealing unsupportable claims and encouraging self-regulation by
advertisers; and to educate the public and allow it to make its own
intelligent choices.8"
84. All-State Industries of North Carolina, Inc., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder]
Trade Cas. 18,740, at 21,105 (FTC 1969). In a third case involving the transfer
of notes of indebtedness, Certified Building Products Inc., [1970-1973 Transfer
Binder] Trade Cas. 19,924, at 21,937 (FTC 1972), the Commission chose not to
make an express unfairness allegation. On the issue of deception the administrative
law judge dismissed the charges because: (1) there was no evidence that the defend-
ants were in substantial competition with anyone; (2) the interstate business of the de-
fendants was minimal; and (3) there was no substantial, credible evidence of false, mis-
leading, or deceptive statements. [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] Trade Cas. 20,241
(FTC 1973).
85. Thain, Consumer Protection: Advertising-The FTC Response, 26 FOOD DRUG
CosM. L.J. 609, 616-20 (1971). At the time of this article, Mr. Thain was Assistant
Director for Food and Drug Advertising, Bureau of Consumer Protection of the FTC.
86. 2 TRADE REG. REP. 7573. The statutory basis for the FTC's substantive rule-
making authority has been litigated in National Petroleum Refiners Association v.
FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3485 (U.S. Feb. 26,
1974).
87. In an address before the American Association of Advertising Agencies in
Santa Barbara, California on October 17, 1973, Chairman Lewis Engman of the FTC
expressed disappointment with the lack of public interest in using the advertising sub-
stantiation documents on file with the FTC. Chairman Engman noted the overwhelm-
ing volume and complexity of these reports and expressed dissatisfaction with the prob-
lem of delay between the time in which the documents are requested and the time in
which the data are evaluated.
1974
Loyola University Law Journal
This intent was put to the test in The Matter of Pfizer, Inc.,88 where
the FTC challenged Pfizer's advertising for "Unburn" suntan lotion
which was claimed to "stop pain fast." The FTC, alleging that the
advertising claims were not substantiated by adequate and well con-
trolled scientific studies or tests prior to their release, charged that this
practice violated section 5 because it was not only deceptive but also
unfair.
The full Commission rejected the deception charge on the ground
that the evidence showed no implied representation that the claims
were substantiated by adequate evidence. However, relying princi-
pally upon All-State Industries and Sperry & Hutchinson Co., the Com-
mission sustained complaint counsel's allegation of unfairness. The
Commission noted the imbalance of knowledge and resources exist-
ing between a business and its customers, holding that an affirmative
advertising claim made without prior substantiation was unfair."9
"Fairness to the consumer, as well as fairness to competitors, dictates
this conclusion."90 The Commission discussed the "economic gamble"
involved in a consumer's reliance upon affirmative product claims and
the "minimal cost and burden on vendors" caused by requiring a rea-
sonable basis of substantiation. 91
Given the broad powers granted the FTC as discussed in Sperry
& Hutchinson Co. and the manner in which the unfairness doctrine
was applied in All-State Industries and Southern States, it would seem
reasonable for the Commission to condemn Pfizer's advertisements for
their failure to disclose the lack of pre-claim data. However, by stat-
ing that advertising in the absence of pre-claim data is itself unfair,
the FTC appears to be taking a further step which it refused to take
in the sales practice cases: that is, prohibiting a practice as opposed
to merely regulating the failure to disclose.92
The requirement of advertising substantiation received judicial
notice in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC9" The Commission
charged Firestone with being both unfair and deceptive in its claims
88. 572 ATRR: D-1 (1972).
89. The Commission did reject complaint counsel's substantiation standard of "ade-
quate and well-controlled scientific studies or tests" in favor of a "reasonable basis"
for the claim. 572 ATRR: D-5 (1972).
90. 572 ATRR: D-3 (1972).
91. Id. However, the complaint was dismissed because complaint counsel failed to
prove that respondent lacked a reasonable basis for its claims.
92. Even the presence of pre-claim data does not immunize the advertiser from a
section 5 violation. Clearly, an advertisement which makes claims beyond those sup-
ported by the pre-claim data could be found unfair or deceptive.
93. [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] Trade Cas. 1 20,112, at 20,080 (FTC 1972); affd,
481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973).
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that its tires could stop 25% quicker, were free from defects, and were
safe under all conditions of use. The basis for the allegation was that
Firestone's advertisements were "without substantial scientific data to
support them" and were claims "which consumers themselves cannot
verify."94 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
Commission's order, but preferred to phrase its decision in terms of
deception rather than unfairness. The court relied upon Firestone's
own customer surveys to show that some of its customers were de-
ceived by the advertisements. The apparent reluctance of the court to
stress the somewhat novel unfairness theory to the same extent as did
the FTC in Pfizer could perhaps be attributed to the presence of these
surveys and their clearly deceptive implications.
The FTC explored a somewhat different application of the unfair-
ness doctrine in The Matter of ITT Continental Baking Co., Inc.95
That case involved a television advertisement for Wonder Bread in
which a child was depicted in a "magical growth sequence" while var-
ious claims as to the bread's nutritional qualities were made. The
complaint charged allegations based on three issues: uniqueness, de-
ception, and unfairness. It was urged that respondent had represent-
ed its product as superior and unique from all other enriched breads
and that, in fact, Wonder Bread did not deserve this claim.
The FTC dismissed this charge on the basis that the record did
not indicate that the representation was made. 96 However, the Com-
mission did find a representation that Wonder Bread was an "extra-
ordinary food"9 7 and concluded that this claim was false and deceptive.
The majority opinion refused to accept the unfairness allegation which
was based on "the portrayal of Wonder Bread as an extraordinary and
necessary growth producing food [which] unfairly exploits children's
aspirations and parental concerns about their healthy growth and de-
velopment." '  The Commission construed the unfairness argument
as resting almost entirely on the false promises made by the advertise-
ment and therefore had difficulty in seeing how the injuries stemming
from the falsity constituted a separate charge of unfairness.
In his dissent,99 Chairman Engman supported complaint counsel's
separate charge of unfairness. Engman constructed his argument with
four premises which he found substantiated in the record:
94. 481 F.2d at 250.
95. 637 ATRR: E-1 (1973).
96. Id. at E-5.
97. Id. at E-6.
98. Id. at E-7.
99. Id. at E-11.
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(1) That the advertisements portraying Wonder Bread as an ex-
traordinary growth-producing food were either specifically
directed at children or seen by a substantial number of
children;
(2) That children under the age of six tend to perceive the
magical growth sequence as a promise of reality;
(3) That children do not fully understand their physical growth
process and have strong aspirations for rapid healthy growth;
and
(4) That children under the age of six are highly vulnerable to
the type of psychological claim promising rapid growth.
In conclusion, Engman found unfairness in that the advertisements
tended to "capitalize on children's anxiety about growth and exploit
their difficulty or inability to differentiate between reality and fantasy." 100
The application of the unfairness doctrine to protect the psychologi-
cal vulnerability of the advertising audience has often been discussed
but never specifically relied upon by a court of law.' The legisla-
tive history of the Wheeler-Lea Amendment makes only a passing re-
ference to the problem:
[W]e cannot ignore the evils and abuses of advertising; the
imposition upon the unsuspecting; and the downright criminality
of preying upon the sick as well as the consuming public through
fraudulent, false, or subtle misleading advertisements. 10 2
The primary area of concern, as illustrated in Chairman Engman's
dissent in ITT Continental Baking Co. and his comments before
the American Bar Association, 10 3 lies with television advertising directed
at children. Although children are not usually the direct consumers,
their preferences undoubtedly influence their parents' buying habits.
The use of the unfairness doctrine on their behalf is premised on the
assumption that advertising specifically directed at a segment of the
population, using methods which appeal to the distinguishing traits
which make that segment of the audience particularly sensitive or vul-
nerable to the advertised claims, should be prohibited. On this basis,
not only should children's inability to distinguish fantasy from reality
be protected, but teenagers' desire for "sex appeal" and the elderly's
search for "lost youth" arguably qualify for protection. The difficulty
with an approach of this type appears to be the necessity of relying
100. Id.
101. See Note, Psychological Advertising: A New Area of FTC Regulation, 1972
Wisc. L. REv. 1097. Also see the comments of G. Thain, note 85 supra.
102. H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1937).
103. 625 ATRR: A-16 (1973); see also 626 ATRR: A-19 (1973).
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on the FTC's expertise in the area of psychological and motivational
research rather than trade regulation.
Summary
The unfairness doctrine has been exposed to several areas of trade
regulation within the scope of section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act. Although the notion of unfairness has been utilized in
several cases involving sales practices, unfairness as a concept distinct
from deception has been primarily restricted to cases of negative
option selling and regulation of the holder in due course doctrine. In
these areas, failure to disclose the existence of the negative option or
the assignee has been held unfair. In advertising cases, the practice
itself, including advertising without pre-claim data or focusing upon
the particular vulnerabilities of the audience, has been attacked as un-
fair. The uncertainty under which the FTC has proceeded stems
directly from the uncertainty surrounding the term "unfair." The
scope and utility of the power to prohibit unfair trade practices de-
serves careful scrutiny.
UNFAIRNESS AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE STANDARD
The consideration of "unfairness" as a legal standard for the regula-
tion of trade necessarily involves the threshold question of whether
the term "unfair" as used in section 5 is to serve as a per se standard
or, alternatively, whether more explicit and consequently limiting
standards must be devised by the FTC as it interprets and defines "un-
fairness." The distinction is relevant to the determination of whether
an adjudicatory analysis on a case-by-case basis or a rulemaking proce-
dure is the proper application of the standard. With either approach
two additional factors must be considered: (1) constitutional limita-
tions and (2) utility.
Constitutional Considerations
The application of an administrative definition and interpretation
approach to the unfairness standard brings the non-delegation doctrine
into play. Implementation of the unfair per se approach potentially
involves a vagueness or due process problem. When applied to adver-
tising, either approach could result in first amendment freedom of
speech objections on behalf of the regulated party. Each of these fac-
tors will be briefly considered.
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The non-delegation doctrine stands for the proposition that the
legislative power of Congress cannot be delegated.10 4  The objection
to the definitional approach is that the role of interpreting the legisla-
tive standard of unfairness properly belongs to the courts, and the
FTC's act of promulgating more specific guidelines constitutes a usur-
pation of legislative authority.' 05 However, as Professor Davis has
noted, this doctrine has largely been ignored by both the legislature
and the courts. 06 In fact, only two decisions still stand upholding
this doctrine, and their utility as sound law is in grave doubt today.' 07
The question has usually been determined by the presence or absence
of a legislative standard by which the agency may guide its quasi-legis-
lative authority. History has shown that these standards may be ex-
tremely broad and vague.' 0 s Given the legislative authority to regu-
late "unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices," the problem of the non-delegation doctrine would appear
to be more theoretical than real.'0 9
The vagueness problem may also be insubstantial. The argument
that the term "unfair" is so indefinite that parties cannot be sufficiently
certain of the Commission's regulatory authority was discredited soon
after the inception of the FTC. In Sears Roebuck & Co. v. FTC,"10
it was held that the term is "no more indefinite than 'due process
of law,' ""I and that the "general ideas of dishonesty and fraud are
so well . . . understood -that the general terms .. .are sufficiently
accurate measures of conduct.""' 2  It might be argued that while "un-
fair" is not vague ir respect to methods of competition because of
the antitrust laws, it is vague in reference to "acts or practices," be-
cause no overriding purpose or expression of federal intent is present.
104. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
105. This question may also involve the scope of the FTC's rulemaking powers. See
note 86 supra.
106. K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 2.02 at 28 (3d ed. 1972).
107. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
108. The Supreme Court has held the following legislative standards sufficiently
definite to justify a delegation of authority: "just and reasonable," Tagg Bros. & Moor-
head v. U.S., 280 U.S. 420 (1930); "public interest," N.Y. Central Securities Corp. v.
U.S., 287 U.S. 12 (1932); "public convenience, interest, or necessity," Federal Radio
Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933); "unduly
or unnecessarily complicate the structure," American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329
U.S. 90, 104-06 (1946).
The "unconscionable" contract has been adopted as a standard in the Uniform Com-
mercial Code § 2-302.
109. A proceeding by the FTC must be in the "public interest," FTC v. Gratz, 253
U.S. 421, 427 (1920). See also note 26 supra.
110. 258 F. 307 (7th Cir. 1919).
111. Id. at311.112. ld.
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The rebuttal to this contention lies in the apparent satisfaction of Con-
gress with the standard as it stood after twenty-four years of applica-
tion to methods of competition, and the absence of any intention to
further restrict the Commission's authority in the Wheeler-Lea
Amendment. 113  The reference to the FTC's equity powers in FTC
v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co."' suggests judicial recognition of the legis-
lative right to endow an adminstrative agency with broad and flexible
powers. 1 15  Thus, the objection to an unfairness per se standard on
vagueness grounds would probably meet with little success.
When section 5 has been applied to advertising, a first amendment
defense has occasionally been forwarded. This defense has also met
discredit in the courts. The argument that advertising as a form of
speech should be protected has been rejected when the ads were
fraudulent or misleading."' The question becomes whether unfair ad-
vertising which is neither fraudulent nor misleading is similarly un-
protected. In Valentine v. Chrestensen,"1 a case involving the distri-
bution of handbills advertising a submarine open for public exhibition,
the Supreme Court, in upholding a municipal ordinance forbidding
such distribution, stated that "the Constitution imposes no . . . re-
straint on government as respects purely commercial advertising."" 8
Similarly, first amendment protection was not held absolute in respect
to door-to-door sales of periodicals."19  On the other hand, " . . .
statements [which] would otherwise be constitutionally protected . . .
do not forfeit that protection simply because they were published in
the form of a paid adveritsement."' 120  Consequently, it appears that
any first amendment protection for advertisements which are found
to be unfair hinges upon the commercial or non-commercial context
in which they are used.12 '
113. See note 35 supra.
114. 405 U.S. 241, 244 (1972).
115. The FTC has apparently taken notice of this reference to equity powers in
connection with its ability to fashion remedies. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
FTC, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] Trade Cas. % 20,112, at 22,084 (FTC 1972); afI'd, 481
F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973).
116. Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 189-90 (1948), where the
use of the mails for fraudulent advertising purposes was prohibited; Regina Corp. v.
FTC, 322 F.2d 765, 770 (3d Cir. 1963), prohibited misleading "suggested list prices"
distributed through newspaper advertisements; E.F. Drew & Co. v. FTC, 235 F.2d 735,
739 (2d Cir. 1956), where the mails and interstate commerce were used to misrepresent
oleomargarine as a dairy product.
117. 316U.S. 52(1941).
118. Id. at 54.
119. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-45 (1951).
120. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
121. For the distinction between commercial and non-commercial advertising, see
note 124 infra.
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A recent potential application of the first amendment to "advertising
speech" involves so-called "image ads" sponsored by the major oil
companies. The advertisements, which have run on television, radio,
and in the newspapers, express concern about the energy crisis and
emphasize the roles which the oil companies are playing to minimize
its impact. Several members of Congress have petitioned the FTC
to investigate these advertisements and require backup data to sub-
stantiate any claims made. 122  Interestingly, the advertisements could
possibly provide a new testing ground for the unfairness doctrine as
well as present serious first amendment questions. Aside from de-
ception considerations, the advertisements may be "playing on the
anxieties of the American people."' 28  However, the fact that public
or political issues are involved may be sufficient to provide a first
amendment defense.12 4
Utility of the Standard
The unfairness doctrine, whether approached from the per se or
definitional perspective is valuable to the FTC only to the extent that
it is workable. In order to be useful, a standard generally must satis-
fy at least three requirements: (1) fulfill a need; (2) afford pre-
dictability and guidance for a given set of facts; and (3) be easily
determinable within the capabilities of the agency.
It is obvious that the unfairness doctrine fulfills a need of the FTC.
Both sales and advertising practices have been developed which,
though not necessarily deceptive or false, accentuate the difference
in bargaining position and factual knowledge which exists between the
manufacturer-seller and the consumer-buyer. To the extent that one
122. 646 ATRR: A-II (1974).
123. 645 ATRR: AA-3 (1974) (remarks of J.T. Rosch, new Director of FTC's
Bureau of Consumer Protection). Mr. Rosch's comments suggest an application of the
unfairness doctrine along the lines of ITT Continental Baking Co. in which it was al-
leged to be unfair to play upon the psychological vulnerability of the audience.
Also, since a claim for advertising substantiation is involved, advertising in the ab-
sence of pre-claim data may be unfair under a Pfizer approach. Alternatively, it might
be argued that the unavailability or non-existence of oil supply and demand statistics
to the government or the general public precludes advertising which builds the cor-
porate image.
124. In N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1963), the Court distinguished non-
commercial advertising from commercial advertising in that the former "communicated
information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought
financial support in behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters
of the highest public interest and concern." Id. at 266.
Chairman Engman of the FTC has stated that the FTC should proceed against
image advertisements only in clear-cut cases of commercial appeal or effect. "Person-
ally, I would conclude in a close case that the wisest course is to give the benefit of
the doubt to an advertiser's rights-indeed, to every citizen's rights-under the first
amendment." 651 ATRR: A-1 (1974).
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party is not fully aware of all the facts or capable of evaluating them,
the unfairness doctrine supplies the FTC with an additional weapon.
Whether or not the unfairness doctrine satisfactorily affords predict-
ability and guidance for both the FTC and the potential violator in
a given set of facts is a more difficult question. The Supreme Court,
in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion,"' was called upon to consider a specific application of the Fed-
eral Communications Commission's (FCC) fairness doctrine. The case
arose because of Red Lion's refusal to grant equal time to an author
who had been personally attacked in an editorial broadcast by the sta-
tion. The FCC had ordered the station to comply with the author's
request for a tape of the editorial and equal time under the fairness
doctrine and certain codified regulations published thereunder. The
Supreme Court, in upholding the lower court's finding of the doctrine's
constitutionality despite first amendment arguments, 26 noted that "the
fairness doctrine finds specific recognition in statutory form, is in part
modeled on explicit statutory provisions . . . and is approvingly re-
flected in legislative history.' '1 27
Obviously, the first l2 and arguably the third129 requirements of the
workability test are present in the case of the unfairness doctrine. In
discussing the requirement of "explicit statutory provisions," the Court
stressed the long series of FCC rulings involving the fairness doctrine,
the publication of precise substantive regulations on the subject, and
the fact that "Congress has not just kept its silence by refusing to
overturn the administrative construction [of the doctrine], but has
ratified it with positive legislation"'' 1 0 in the form of the Equal Time
Act.13 ' Although the Wheeler-Lea Amendment arguably could
qualify as "positive legislation" in an FTC context, the unfairness doc-
trine is deficient through lack of numerous FTC rulings and, other
than the cigarette regulations mentioned in Sperry & Hutchinson
Co., 13 z in "precise substantive regulations on the subject." Neverthe-
less, the Court went on to state in Red Lion:
It is the fairness doctrine as an aspect of the obligation to operate
in the public interest, rather than section 315 [the Equal Time
Act], which prohibits the broadcaster from taking such a step [as
125. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
126. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
127. 395 U.S. at 380.
128. See note 2 supra.
129. See notes 3-9, 31-36 supra.
130. 395 U.S. at 381-82.
131. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970).
132. See note 56 supra.
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refusing equal time]. 133
Given the "public interest" requirement long demanded of the
FTC," 4 the unfairness doctrine conceivably would find similar favor
with the Supreme Court if it were refined and clarified by decisions
and regulations. Predictability, which would necessarily result from
such decisions and regulations, would appear to favor a definitional
approach to the unfairness standard.
The third requirement of a useful standard demands that the stand-
ard be easily determinable within the capabilities of the agency. The
expertise of the FTC in trade regulation matters has repeatedly been
recognized and relied upon by reviewing courts;3 5 however, in the
final -analysis, section 5 sets forth a legal standard which must derive
its meaning from judicial construction.3 6 The areas of unfair sales
and advertising practices are two regions in which the Commission's
expertise is particularly applicable. However, this is not to say that
the agency is qualified to regulate or prohibit all sales or advertising
practices. In regard to those practices which have already been
attacked through the unfairness doctrine, the ITT Continental Baking
Co.13 7 case and Chairman Engman's emphasis upon the psycho-
logical vulnerability of the audience seem least appropriate for unfair-
ness applications. The apparent necessity for psychological and moti-
vational studies, which are generally not within the Commission's ex-
pertise, deprives all parties concerned of the important qualities of pre-
dictability and easy determination of the outcome. If the unfairness
doctrine is to be satisfactorily developed, it must be based on useful
and workable standards.
CONCLUSION
Traditionally, the FTC has concentrated its efforts in two categories
of authority under section 5 of the FTC Act:
(1) Unfair methods of competition under the letter or spirit of
the antitrust laws; and
(2) Deceptive acts or practices in respect to consumers.
Recent litigation and other expressions of FTC authority have indicat-
ed a third area of concern:
133. 395 U.S. at 383.
134. See note 109 supra.
135. Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946); FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive
Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
136. FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304 (1933).
137. 637 ATRR: E-1 (1973).
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(3) Acts or practices which are unfair to consumers.
Although this new emphasis represents a significant advance for con-
sumerism, the FTC must not forget its mandate to administer the law
under legal standards. Only time will tell whether the Commission
is capable of implementing the complex unfairness standard which such
a mandate requires.
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